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RECENT DECISIONS 
CIVII. PROCEDURE - PROCESS - AMENDMENT WHEN A p ARTNBRSHIP IS 
SERVED AS A CoRPORATION-Plaintiff instituted a negligence action for personal 
injuries by serving a summons and complaint on one Moriarty as an officer of 
Moriarty Manufacturing Company, intending thereby a substituted service on 
this company. Plaintiff believed the named :6rm to be a corporation, but it was 
in fact a partnership of which Moriarty was a member. There was no appear-
ance or answer. Two and one-half years after the initial service, an amended 
summons and complaint were served on all of the partners. In answer, defend-
ants pleaded a two-year statute of limitations1 and moved for a summary judg-
ment, which was granted. On appeal, held, affirmed. The first• process was 
defective since it was not served on the partners individually but was directed 
at a nonexistent corporation.2 The second service could not qualify as an amend-
ment to the first since to allow this would have the effect of bringing a new 
party before the court. Ausen v. Moriarty, (Wis. 1954) 67 N.W. (2d) 358. 
The wording of statutes with regard to the amendment of pleadings is often 
general;3 consequently confficts with older, more stringent concepts of pleading 
and practice arise. As in the principal case it frequently cannot be determined 
from a reading of the statute whether an amendment should be allowed where 
one of these older concepts is involved. Traditionally jurisdiction over the de-
fendant is obtained by service of process. H there is a defect in this service, the 
court has no jurisdiction over the defendant.4 Lacking this jurisdiction, there is 
no proceeding before the court and thus it cannot grant an amendment. Courts 
have avoided this reasoning in diverse ways, none of which is convincing. One 
method, perhaps the most common, involves two steps. First, the jurisdiction 
1 Wis. Stat. (1953) §330.19(5) provides for a 6-year limitation on actions arising out 
of personal injuries and includes a two-year notice of injury provisions: " ••. notice in 
writing ••• shall be served .••• Such notice shall be given in the manner required for the 
service of summons. • • ." The purpose of the notice provision is to make the defendant 
aware of the pendency of the suit in time to investigate the evidence. Nelson v. American 
Employers' Ins. Co., 262 Wis. 271, 55 N.W. (2d) 13 (1952). The statute anticipates 
substantial compliance with the summons requirements. Budke v. Holvick, 255 Wis. 293, 
38 N.W. (2d) 479 (1949). Emphasizing these two interpretations of the statute, the 
court in the principal case might well have reached the conclusion that sufficient notice 
had been given, thus bringing the normal 6-year limitation into play. But see Voss v. 
Tittel, 219 Wis. 175, 262 N.W. 579 (1935). Also questionable is the court's concern 
over "substituted" notice. · 
2 Service against a partnership in Wisconsin is accomplished by service on each part-
ner individually. Stangarone v. Jacobs, 188 Wis. 20, 205 N.W. 318 (1925). But see 
Wis. Stat. (1953) §260.21(3). 
a "The court may, at any stage of any action ••• before or after judgment, in further-
ance of justice and upon such terms as may be just, amend any process. • • ." Wis. Stat. 
(1953) §269.44. 
4 "A civil action • • • shall be commenced by the service of summons. • • • From the 
time of such service ..• the court shall have jurisdiction and have control of all subsequent 
proceedings." Wis. Stat. (1953) §262.01. The Missouri court, in an action similar to 
that involved in the principal case, said, "Lack of jurisdiction is incurable and spells death 
to the cause sought to be maintained without it." Haney v. Thomson, 339 Mo. 505 at 
514, 98 s.w. (2d) 639 (1936). 
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rule is restated or transposed (probably inadvertently) so that it reads: ''No 
new parties can be brought into court by way of an amendment." Having 
replaced the jurisdiction rule with the new party rule, the court then begs the 
question by stating simply that no new parties are involved.5 A second device is 
the entity theory; the court says that the plaintiff sued the "entity," the partner-
ship, and merely misnamed it in the summons.6 Both views are aided in some 
states by statutes permitting suit against a partnership in the £rm name.7 How-
ever desirable these results may be, the means are subject to attack. Save the 
situation where jurisdiction is acquired through an appearance of the defendant 
before the statute has run, neither of these analyses expressly answers the prob-
lem of the acquisition of jurisdiction. Perhaps it is felt that such conceptual 
logic of the common law has no place in modem pleading and practice.8 The 
placing of the decision on this ground might be justified by the broad language 
of the amendment statute as well as the general trend of legislation in the field 
of procedure. By reasoning analogous to that of the Supreme Court in United 
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,9 it may be argued that the volume and 
trend of this legislation in any given state is enough to indicate that the legis-
lature has attempted to supplant much of the common law symmetry and logic 
5 McGinnis v. Valvoline Oil Works, 251 Pa. 407, 96 A. 1038 (1916); Grand Lodge 
v. Bollman, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 53 S.W. 829 (1899); Munzinger v. Courier Co., 89 
N.Y. 575, 31 N.Y.S. 737 (1894). Admittedly, it follows from the concept of jurisdiction 
that no new party can be brought before the court by means of amendment. This, how-
ever, does not justify phrasing the basic principles of jurisdiction in these terms. Not all 
courts so expressing the rule go on to reach a result contrary to the dictates of the strict 
jurisdiction theory, e.g., the principal case. 
Some courts add as a requisite to amendment that the defendant make an appearance. 
Markel v. Dowling & Co., 5 Pa. D. & C. 403 (1924); Boehmke v. Northern Ohio Traction 
Co., 88 Ohio St. 156, 102 N.E. 700 (1913). Clearly, if the defendant submits himself 
to the jurisdiction of the court all problems are solved. Appearance as a corporation by the 
party erroneously served would not seem to confer jurisdiction over the intended partner-
ship defendant, however. This requirement seems to give an advantage to the defendant 
who completely ignores the suit. See generally the language of the dissent in Lindsey v. 
Drs. Keenan, Andrews & Allred, 118 Mont. 312 at 323, 165 P. (2d) 804 (1946). 
6 Goldstein v. Peter Fox Sons Co., 22 N.D. 636, 135 N.W. 180 (1912). See also 
World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Alliance Sandblasting Co., 105 Conn. 640, 136 A. 681 
(1927); Ex parte Nicrosi, 103 Ala. 104, 15 S. 507 (1894), involving individuals instead 
of partnerships. See generally, Sturges, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions," 
33 YALB L.J. 383 (1923). 
7 Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23, 53 A. (2d) 73 (1947); Craig 
v. San Fernando Furniture Co., 89 Cal. App. 167, 264 P. 784 (1928). 
s In reaching decisions consonant with modern concepts of substance rather than form, 
several cases have recognized such modem principles as notice [Godfrey v. Eastern Gas & 
Fuel Associates, 71 F. Supp. 175 (1947); McGinnis v. Valvoline Oil Works, supra note 
5] and the right of plaintiff to a day in court [Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371 Pa. 
436, 89 A. (2d) 527 (1952) (involving an individual rather than a partnership), noted 
in 14 Pl'IT. L. REv. 284 (1953) and 26 TEMP. L.Q. 347 (1953)]. Cf. Duff v. Zonis, 
327 Mass. 347, 99 N.E. (2d) 47 (1951). 
9 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570 (1921). Referring to the trend in labor legislation, 
the Court concluded that Congress probably intended the right to sue and be sued in the 
association name as an incident to the greater rights and responsibilities conferred by the 
modern labor enactments. 
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with modem practicality-a shift of emphasis from formalities of service to 
actualities of notice, from the technical, cat-and-mouse element of lawyer versus 
lawyer to the functional element of settling differences between the litigating 
parties. An attack of this type involves nothing more than an emphasis on the 
liberal language of the statute at the expense of common law conceptualism. 
Donald W. Shaffer 
